Portrait of Hume
Hume
Scottish philosopher, historian, economist and essayist (1711–1776)

David Hume was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist and essayist who is known for his highly influential system of empiricism, philosophical scepticism and metaphysical naturalism.

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78
Ideas
11
Passages
444
Citations
This MindMap is generated using weights to determine which ideas this thinker debates with others.
Passages by work
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding11 passages
Human Understanding, SECT ix, DIV 83 487c-d✓ correct
ALL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 38, 466b; DIV 45 469c; SECT ix, DIV 85 488c; SECT XII, DIV Il8, 504C✓ correct
THE passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side which already draws too much, by the bias and propensity of the natural… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5, 452d-453a✓ correct
MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV✓ correct
THERE is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the real presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the Apostles,… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT vin, DIV ft 74, 484a✓ correct
THOUGH there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion. There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 20 458a-b; SECT xii, DIV 122 505c-d✓ correct
ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV 103-110, 498b-501b✓ correct
WAS lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes; where, though he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order to submit them to the judgement of the… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT vii, DIV 56 475a-b✓ correct
THE great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECT xii, DIV M2, 509d[fn i]✓ correct
THERE is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contradictions? The knights errant, who wandered about to clear the world… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, si-,cr i, DIV 2 50b-62b; 451b c; DIV 6-10 453b-455b passim; SECT 11, DIV 13-16 455d-457a; SECT iv, DIV 26 460b-c; DIV 29 461a-d …✓ correct
EVERY one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and… Read the rest of this passage →
Human Understanding, SECTI, DIV 8-9, 454b-455a✓ correct
IT might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of science, and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy… Read the rest of this passage →